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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Richard Wright appeals from the district court's order affirming his 
conviction for leaving the scene of an accident in violation of I.C. § 49-1301(1). 
Wright claims there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
While driving down the road one morning, Timothy DeWitt was behind a 
Jeep Cherokee when he saw the Jeep "cut th[e] corner pretty sharp" and slide 
sideways on the road, which was icy at the time. (Tr., p.16, Ls.14-1S, p.17, 
Ls.11-17.) Donald Blanchard, who was riding with Mr. DeWitt, also saw the Jeep 
slide sideways and saw it hit a speed limit sign. (Tr., p.6, Ls.1-S, p.7, L.17 - p.9, 
L.25.) The Jeep "knocked the sign down" and the driver "continued back out" 
and drove away. (Tr., p.9, L.25 - p.1 0, LA.) Mr. DeWitt followed the Jeep so Mr. 
Blanchard could get the license plate number. (Tr., p.10, L.17 - p.11, L.16.) At 
one point after Mr. DeWitt caught up to the Jeep, which was about to make a left-
hand turn, Mr. DeWitt "hit the horn" to try to get the attention of the Jeep's driver, 
but he "didn't turn his head." (Tr., p.11, Ls.21-23, p.19, Ls.21-24.) Once Mr. 
DeWitt arrived at this destination, he reported the incident to dispatch. (Tr., p.12, 
Ls.13-19.) 
Deputy Patrick Meehan responded to the mechanic shop where Mr. 
Blanchard and Mr. DeWitt worked and took a report. (Tr., p.22, L.21 - p.23, L.5.) 
Deputy Meehan went to investigate the scene of the accident and noticed tire 
marks "where a vehicle had gone over the curb" and "the speed limit sign was 
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broken up at the base and on the ground." (Tr., p.23, Ls.14-25.) Deputy Meehan 
also saw where "the vehicle had gone back onto the roadway" and saw pieces of 
the car on the ground. (Tr., p.23, L.25 - p.24, L.B.) Deputy Meehan reported the 
damaged sign to the "highway district so they could repair it."1 (Tr., p.24, Ls.12-
13.) 
After viewing the accident scene, and based on the license plate number 
Mr. Blanchard recorded, Deputy Meehan went to Wright's residence and made 
contact with Wright's wife. (Tr., p.23, Ls.5-12, p.25, Ls.2-10.) Mrs. Wright called 
her husband at work to find out where he was and if he was injured at which time 
he told her "he had slid on the ice and hit a sign and that he was okay." (Tr., 
p.25, L.17 - p.26, L.17.) Mrs. Wright then gave her phone to Deputy Joshua 
Leyk, who was working with Deputy Meehan, and confirmed Wright was in an 
accident earlier that morning. (Tr., p.35, L.10 - p.36, L.7.) Wright repeated that 
he "had slipped on the ice" and "had knocked over a traffic sign," and stated that 
he "intended to report the accident to law enforcement" on a "self-report form." 
(Tr., p.36, LS.17 -23.) Deputy Leyk then arranged to meet Wright at his business. 
(Tr., p.37, Ls.3-B.) At Wright's business, the deputies saw the Jeep, which had 
damage consistent with what the witnesses described and what the deputy 
observed at the accident scene. (Tr., p.27, LA - p.2B, L.17, p.39, Ls.1-B.) At 
that time, however, Wright denied any involvement in the accident, claiming 
someone else had been driving, but he would not say who. (Tr., pA2, Ls.1-16.) 
1 According to Deputy Meehan, the highway district also received a call from an 
"anonymous person" who reported that "they had seen a black Jeep Grand 
Cherokee slide off the road and take out a sign." (Tr., p.24, Ls.14-20.) 
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Despite Wright's revised claim that he was not driving the Jeep at the time 
of the accident, Wright was issued a citation for violating I.C. § 49-1301. (R., 
p.6.) Wright represented himself at a court trial after which the magistrate found 
him guilty. (Tr., pp.53-57.) The court subsequently entered a withheld judgment 
and ordered Wright to pay fines, costs, and restitution, which was stayed while 
Wright appealed. (R., pp.22-27, 32-36, 39-41.) 
On appeal to the district court, Wright argued (1) the evidence was 
insufficient, claiming I.C. § 49-1301 has no application to collisions between a 
vehicle and personal property "where the factors set forth in Idaho Code § 49-
1305 are not met" and (2) he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at 
his court trial. (R., pp.42-61.) The district court affirmed Wright's conviction and 
denied Wright's subsequent petition for rehearing. (R., pp.83-101, 130-141, 173-
174.) Wright filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. (R, pp.177-180.) 
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ISSUE 
Wright states the issue on appeal as: 
I. Whether the evidence at trial was insufficient for the trial court to 
convict the Defendant of a violation of Idaho Code § 49-1301 
A. Idaho Code § 49-1301 should not apply to collisions 
between a vehicle and personal property where the factors 
set forth in Idaho Code § 49-1305 are not met. 
B. The State of Idaho failed to prove each essential element 
of the charged violation of Idaho Code § 49-1301 at trial. 
(Appellant's Opening Brief, p.5.) 
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ARGUMENT 
Wright challenges his conviction for leaving the scene of an accident in 
violation of I.C. § 49-1301, claiming the state presented insufficient evidence that 
he violated the requirements of that statute. More specifically, Wright argues that 
his act of leaving the scene after he ran into the stop sign was not prohibited by 
I.C. § 49-1301. (See generally Appellant's Opening Brief.) The district court, in 
its intermediated appellate capacity, rejected this argument. (R., pp.83-101.) 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The 
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." 19.:. 
"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if 
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] 
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure." 19.:. (citing Losser, 145 
Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 
(1981 )). 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon 
a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); 
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State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570,826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hart, 112 
Idaho 759,761,735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting this review 
the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the trier of fact as to the 
credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 
607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 
Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn 
from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding the verdict. Miller, 131 
Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072. 
The statutory provision under which Wright was convicted, states: 
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident, either on public or 
private property open to the public, resulting only in damage to a 
vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall immediately 
stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as close as 
possible, and shall immediately return to, and in every event shall 
remain at, the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the 
requirements of the law. 
I.C. § 49-1301(1). 
In order to determine whether Wright's conduct was proscribed by I.C. § 
49-1301, the Court must engage in statutory interpretation. The interpretation of 
a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute. State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 
326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009). Where the statutory language is 
unambiguous, a court does not construe it but simply follows the law as written. 
McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810,813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 
(2006). Thus, if the plain language of a statute is capable of only one reasonable 
interpretation, it is the Court's duty to give the statute that interpretation. Verska 
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v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, _, 265 P.3d 502, 
508-09 (2011). 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal the district court 
rejected Wright's argument that his actions did not constitute a violation of I.C. § 
49-1301. A copy of that decision is attached hereto as Appendix A for this 
Court's review. 
DATED this 20th day of August, 2012. 
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Case No. CRM 2009 25609 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON APPEAL 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND. 
Defendant Richard W. Wright (Wright) appeals from an Order of Magistrate Judge Penny 
Friedlander, finding him guilty of the misdemeanor violation ofIdaho Code § 49-1301 (Accidents 
Involving Damage to Vehicle) (Tr. P. 56, Ll. 13-15), and subsequently sentencing him to a withheld 
judgment. The citation itself calls out a violation of I.e. § 49-1301. 
The evidence establishes on the morning of December 18, 2009, Wright was the driver ofan 
automobile which, due to icy conditions, went off of the road, struck a speed limit sign, knocked the 
sign down, and then reentered the roadway. Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 2. A court trial was held 
on March 1,2010, in which Wright represented himselfpro se. At the conclusion of the trial, 
Magistrate Judge Penny Friedlander found Wright guilty of violating I.C. § 49-1301 beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Tr., p. 56, Ll. 13-15. 
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Following the conviction, Judge Friedlander inquired whether Wright was prepared to 
proceed to disposition, and Wright requested additional time to consult with an attorney for appeal. 
The precise dialogue was as follows: 
Q. [the Court] So at this time I do find for the State beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Mr. Wright, do you wish to proceed to disposition today or would you like to wait 
and have me set this? 
A. [Mr. Wright] I would request time to consult with an attorney for an appeal. 
Tr., p. 57, Ll. 11-14. The deputy prosecutor for the State then stated: "because this is somewhat of 
an unusual case, but I really don't think that uh, there's really any need to have any delay on 
sentencing." Tr., p. 58, LL. 11-13. The State indicated on the record it would recommend a 
withheld judgment, with which the Court agreed. Tr., p. 58, Ll. 3-4; p. 59, Ll. 2-3. Afterexplaining 
what a withheld judgment is, the Court withheld judgment for a period of one year, setting certain 
conditions. Tr., p. 63, Ll. 3-16. 
Wright filed his Notice of Appeal on April 9, 2010, setting forth the question of whether I.C. 
§ 49-1301 is applicable to single-vehicle collisions between a driver's vehicle and a fixture where the 
driver failed to remain on the scene. Notice of Appeal, p. 2, , 3(a)(I). Wright filed his opening brief 
on July 28, 2010, one day late pursuant to the Notice of Settling Transcript on Appeal and Briefing 
Schedule filed June 22,2010. Wright argued the State failed to prove each essential element to the 
charged violation and that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in light of the 
Court's explaining a withheld judgment. Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 7-14. On August 12,2010, 
the State timely filed its Memorandum Opposing Appellant's Opening Brief. On September 5, 2010, 
Wright timely filed his Reply Brief. After that, neither Wright nor the State noticed the matter for 
argument on appeal pursuant to LC.R. 54.16. On March 1, 2011, this matter was noticed-up by this 
Court for oral argument on May 10, 2011. Oral argument was held on May 10, 2011, and the Court 
took the matter under advisement. 
/ 
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
Appeals from the magistrate's division shall be heard by the district court as an appellate 
proceeding unless the district court orders a trial de novo. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.2. Where a 
district court acts in an appellate capacity on an appeal taken from the magistrate's division, and a 
further appeal is taken, appellate courts review the record independently of, but with due regard for, 
the decision of the district court. State v. Bailey, 117 Idaho 941, 942, 792 P.2d 966, 967 (Ct.App. 
1990). In reviewing claims of violations of constitutional rights, appellate courts defer to factual 
findings not found to be clearly erroneous, but exercise free review of whether constitutional 
requirements were met. State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 488, 95 P.3d 635,639 (2004) (citing State 
v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449, 776 P.2d458 (1989)). 
On appeal, where a defendant stands convicted, the evidence is viewed in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution and the reviewing court is precluded from 
substituting its judgment for that of the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, the 
weight of the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. 
State v. Allen, 129 Idaho 556, 558,929 P.2d 118, 120 (1996) (quoting State v. Gardiner, 127 Idaho 
156, 163,898 P.2d 615,622 (Ct.App. 1995)). A judgment of conviction will not be overturned on 
appeal when substantial and competent evidence, though it may be conflicting, supports the 
judgment. State v. Warner, 97 Idaho 204, 206, 541 P.2d 977,979 (1975) (citing State v. Shannon, 95 
Idaho 299, 303, 507 P.2d 808,812 (1973). 
In general, the failure to raise an issue before the trial court waives that issue for purposes of 
appeal. State v. Lenon, 143 Idaho 415,417, 146 P.3d 681,683 (Ct.App. 2005), citing State v. Fodge, 
121 Idaho 192, 195,824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). However, in the case of fundamental error in a 
criminal case, we may consider the issue even though no objection was made at time of trial. Jd., 
citing State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 251, 486 P.2d 260, 262 (1971). 
/ 
/ 
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III. ANALYSIS ON APPEAL. 
A. WRIGHT DID NOT RAISE THE ISSUE OF LACK OF PROOFIPROPER 
CHARGING BEFORE THE MAGISTRATE. 
At trial, Wright focused his argument on the witnesses had not identified him as the driver. 
Tr. p. 52, Ll. 6-11. Wright argued before the magistrate that" ... there is not enough evidence to rule 
uh, 100 percent that the defendant was driving the vehicle and that somebody else could have been 
driving that vehicle." Tr. p. 53, Ll. 2-6. That argument ignores the fact that only one person was 
driving the Jeep Cherokee in question. Judge Friedlander commented on that fact. Tr., p. 54, Ll. 4-
6. That argument ignores the fact that Wright eventually confessed on the phone to law enforcement. 
Tr. p. 36, Ll. 20-25. The citing officer, Kootenai County Sheriff Deputy Joshua J. Leyk, testified 
that when he confronted Wright about the accident, Wright said he was aware that he'd knocked over 
the sign, that he was a former law enforcement officer and that he intended to use the "self-report 
form" that he was familiar with. Tr. p. 36, Ll. 20-25. Judge Friedlander commented on the fact that 
Wright admitted to law enforcement he had knocked over the sign. Tr. p. 55, L 24 - p. 56, L. 2. 
Wright's arguments on appeal are that a charge under I.C. § 49-1301 was improper and there 
was insufficient evidence at trial to support a conviction under I.e. § 49-1301. Wright's arguments 
on appeal ignore the fact that he did not raise either of those issues before Judge Friedlander at trial. 
In State v. Lenon, 143 Idaho 415, 417, 146 P.3d 681,683 (Ct.App. 2005), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals held: 
In general, the failure to raise an issue before the trial court waives that 
issue for purposes of appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 
126 (1992). However, in the case of fundamental error in a criminal case, we may 
consider the issue even though no objection was made at time of trial. State v. 
Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 251, 486 P.2d 260,262 (1971). In Rutherford, we 
allowed a claim of breach of a plea agreement to be raised for the first time on 
appeal because "a breach of a plea bargain agreement by the state affects the 
voluntariness of the guilty plea and is fundamental error." Id at 915, 693 P.2d at 
1117. FN3 Based on the ruling in Rutherford, Lenon argues that appellate review of 
his claim should not be barred merely because he failed to pursue it in the district 
court. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON APPEAL page 4 
FN3. The Idaho Supreme Court recently adopted 
Rutherford's reasoning in State v. Jajek, 141 Idaho 71, 74, 106 P .3d 
397,400 (2005). 
We disagree, for fundamental error review is not necessarily appropriate 
where the record shows more than a mere failure to object. The prevailing 
definition of fundamental error in Idaho is expressed in State v. Sarabia, 125 
Idaho 815,818,875 P.2d 227, 230 (1994) (quoting State v. Knowlton, 123 Idaho 
916,918,854 P.2d259, 261 (1993»: 
Error that is fundamental must be such error as goes to the 
foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or must go to the 
foundation of the case or take from the defendant a right which was 
essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to 
permit him to waive. Each case will of necessity, under such a rule, 
stand on its own merits. Out of the facts in each case will arise the 
law. 
The fundamental error doctrine is premised on the obligation to see that a 
defendant receives a fair trial, State v. Lewis, 126 Idaho 77, 80-81, 878 P.2d 776, 
779-80 (1994); State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249,251,486 P.2d 260,262 (1971), 
and is intended to remedy situations where an alleged error may have deprived the 
defendant of his or her constitutional right to a fair proceeding. State v. Kuhn, 139 
Idaho 710, 715,85 PJd 1109, 1114 (Ct.App.2003); State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 
445,448,816 P.2d 1002, 1005 (Ct.App.l991). The fundamental error embodied 
in a breach of a plea agreement may be raised on appeal in the absence of an 
objection at trial because, as this Court stated in Rutherford, "[m]ere silence or the 
failure to object" is insufficient to waive the fundamental rights implicated in a 
guilty plea.ld at 915,693 P.2d at 1117. 
In this case, however, the record demonstrates that Lenon did not overlook 
or merely fail to object to the alleged violation of the plea agreement. Following 
his sentencing, Lenon moved to withdraw his guilty plea or obtain specific 
performance of the agreement because of the prosecutor's alleged breach. This 
motion establishes that Lenon was fully aware of his rights relative to the alleged 
breach. He subsequently withdrew this motion, however, presumably for strategic 
reasons, and thereby prevented the district court from addressing it. Any error 
remains only because Lenon elected not to pursue his challenge in the trial court-
not because he or the trial court failed to recognize it prior to appeal. 
If Lenon had pursued the motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the district 
court could have developed a record on this issue and, if the district court's ruling 
had then been appealed, this Court would have had the benefit of that record. 
Although Rutherford holds that claims of breach of a plea agreement may be 
heard for the first time on appeal, our case law also dictates that such a claim 
should be considered for the first time on appeal only if the record provided is 
sufficient for that purpose. State v. Wills, 140 Idaho 773, 775, 102 P.3d 380, 382 
(Ct.App.2004); State v. Jones, 139 Idaho 299, 301, 77 P.3d 988,990 
(Ct.App.2003); State v. Kellis, 129 Idaho 730, 733-34, 932 P.2d 358,361-62 
(Ct.App.1997). Thus, although claims of breach of a plea agreement may be 
heard initially on appeal with a less-than-fully-developed record, there is a 
preference for a complete record developed in the trial court. Here, by raising and 
then abandoning the motion for a remedy for the alleged breach, Lenon 
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purposefully limited the thoroughness of the record on appeal. We will not reward 
this tactic, referred to by the State as "forum shopping," by hearing the appeal on 
the intentionally limited record. Because Lenon consciously chose to prevent the 
trial court from addressing the alleged error, we will not consider the issue on 
appeal as a claim of fundamental error. It is appropriate here to apply the general 
rule that an appellate court "will not 'review a trial court's alleged error on appeal 
unless the record discloses an adverse ruling which forms the basis for the 
assignment of error.' " State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 384, 987 P.2d 290, 296 
(1999) (quoting State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485,849 P.2d 942,946 (1993». 
Because we find the fundamental error doctrine inapplicable to this case, 
we decline to consider Lenon's only claim of error. The judgment of conviction is 
therefore affirmed. 
143 Idaho 415, 417-18, 146 P.3d 681,683-84. While it is doubtful Wright's failure to raise these 
issues with the trial court were part of a purposeful limitation of the record by Wright on appeal, 
Wright nevertheless precluded Judge Friedlander from considering these issues at trial and 
developing a proper record for appeal. 
As the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Hadley, 122 Idaho 728, 731, 838 P. 2d 331, 334 
(Ct.App. 1992) held: 
Failure to raise constitutional and statutory issues below is a waiver of the 
right to raise the issues on appeal. Whitehawk v. State.. 119 Idaho 168, 804 P.2d 
341 (Ct.App.l991). An exception to this rule is triggered, however, if the issue 
embodies a fundamental error committed by the lower court. A fundamental error 
is one which so profoundly distorts the proceedings that it produces manifest 
injustice depriving the defendant of his fundamental right to due process. State v. 
Lavy, supra. 
This Court concludes Wright failed to raise the issue of insufficient evidence at trial to support a 
conviction under I.C. § 49-1301, and accordingly, Wright has waived his right to hear that issue on 
appeal. Wright also did not raise this issue in his brief on appeal (nor did the State). At oral 
argument, counsel for Wright argued fundamental error was committed in that Wright couldn't have 
been convicted of a crime under a statute that does not apply. This Court finds that claim by 
Wright's counsel does not arise to a level of fundamental error. However, in order to make that 
determination that these issues do not arise to a level of fundamental error, this Court must examine 
the merits of Wright's claim of insufficient evidence. 
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B. WRIGHT WAS PROPERLY CHARGED WITH AND CONVICTED OF A 
VIOLATION OF IDAHO CODE § 49-1301. 
In his opening brief, Wright argues the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him under 
Idaho Code § 49-1301 (Accidents Involving Damage to Vehicle); in part because § 49-1301 does not 
apply to single-vehicle accidents of the type at issue here, and in part because the State failed to 
prove each essential element beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 7-13. 
Wright argues the State failed to prove that he had any duty to report his accident and his striking the 
speed limit sign. Jd, pp.7-8. According to Wright, this is because the State did not prove that a 
violation ofLC. § 49-1305 (Immediate Notice of Accidents), which requires a driver involved in an 
accident resulting in injury or death of anyone, or damage to property valued in excess of $1 ,500 to 
immediately notifY the nearest police station or sheriff's department. Id, pp. 7-11. Wright states 
I.C. § 49-1304 (Duty Upon Striking Fixtures Upon or Adjacent to a Highway) sets forth the duties of 
an individual upon striking offixtures on or adjacent to a highway. Id, pp. 7-8. Wright notes for the 
Court that I.C. § 49-1304 requires a fixture or other property to be legally on or adjacent to a 
roadway, but that the State never submitted any evidence of the speed limit signs legality vis a vis its 
location, or evidence of any injury to any person. Id, p. 8. Wright wholly ignores the fact that he 
was not charged with a violation ofLC. § 49-1304. 
Wright spends much effort pointing out that there was "no evidence of the value of damage 
done to the street sign". Id., pp. 4, 8; Notice of Appeal, p. 2, ~ 3. Wright seems to ignore the fact 
that value of the sign hit only comes into play in a violation ofLC. § 49-1405, a violation of which 
Wright was not charged. "Immediate notice" is required when the accident involves injury of a 
person, death of a person, or damage to a person over $1,500.00. Idaho Code § 49-1405 was not 
alleged in the present case. 
A violation ofIdaho Code § 49-1301 is what was charged, and it requires an immediate stop 
at the scene or as close as possible, and an immediate return to the scene until one has fulfilled the 
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requirements of law. Wright did none of these things. Thus, Wright violated I. C. § 49-1301. 
Wright's counsel's oral argument was that I.C. § 49-1301 sets forth no duty. Wright is false in that 
claim. The statute reads: 
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident, either on public or private property 
open to the public, resulting only in damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended 
by any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as 
close as possible, and shall immediately return to, and in every event shall remain at, 
the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of law. 
Wrighfs duty was to "immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident...and in every event 
shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of the law." Wright 
didn't stop, he kept going and he ran away from what he had done. Wright didn't remain at the 
scene of the accident. Wright's counsel's argument at oral argument was we don't know what the 
"requirements oflaw" were in this situation. Under I.e. § 49-1304, "Duty upon striking fixtures 
upon or adjacent to a highway", the driver shall take reasonable steps to locate and notify the owner 
or person in charge of the property of the fact. Wright was not charged with a violation ofLC. § 49-
1304, but in any event, Wright did not do the things that are required under that statute. So, if that 
statute was tried by agreement by the parties, then Wright is guilty of violating that statute as well. 
Wright never stopped. Wright went to work and told no one of what happened. In fact, when 
Deputy Leyk and Deputy Mehan contacted Wright's wife and watched Wright's wife call Wright at 
work (Tr. p. 25, L. 17 - p. 27, L. 4), Wright told his wife he'd hit the sign and knocked it down (Tr. 
p. 34, Ll. 14-18), and then Deputy Leyk got on the phone and Wright told Deputy Leyk the same 
thing over the phone. Tr. p. 35, L. 25 - p. 36, L. 18. However, when Deputy Leyk arrived at 
Wright's work, Wright changed his story and lied to Deputy Leyk. Deputy Leyk testified: 
Mr. Wright denied have - having any involvement in driving the vehicle at the 
time of the accident. He told me had had been advised his vehicle had been in an 
accident, but - and would not say who was driving the vehicle at the time. 
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Tr. p. 42, Ll. 1-7. There is simply no way Wright took "reasonable steps" under I.C. § 49-1304, to 
notify the owner of the sign when he fled the scene, stayed at his business, and then changed his 
story to Deputy Leyk; thus, there is no way Wright "fulfilled the requirements of law" under I.C. § 
49-1301. If Wright is a former law enforcement officer, as he told Deputy Leyk, Wright does little to 
uphold the reputation of those sworn to serve and protect by subsequently lying to Deputy Leyk. 
Counsel for Wright, without any legal citation, makes the following claim: "The driver of a 
vehicle involved in a collision not involving injury or death and which does not involve damage to 
property of any person in excess of $1,500.00 has no legal duty to report the accident to law 
enforcement." Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 8. Perhaps the reason there is no citation to any legal 
authority is there is no legal authority that would support such a claim. Such an unsubstantiated 
claim is not supported by a plain reading ofI.C. § 49-1301 and I.e. § 49-1304. 
Wright cites to Munns v. Swift Transportation Co., 138 Idaho 108, 111,58 P.3d 92, 95 
(2002), for the proposition that I. C. § 49-1301 does not apply to cases in which there is only minor 
damage to the driver's vehicle and to personal property. Id, pp. 10-11. Munns was a negligence 
case in which the truck driver for Swift Transportation Co. hit and killed horse on Highway 20 
between Rexburg and Idaho Falls, Idaho, and kept going, the dead horse being left in the highway. 
Munns came along later when it was dark and rainy, and hit the horse in the middle of the road, and 
Munns was seriously injured. 138 Idaho 108, 109,58 P.3d 92,93. The Idaho Supreme Court held 
the negligence per se instruction should not have been given to the jury because" ... I.C. § 49-1301 
cannot be held to define conduct that would give rise to negligence per se under the facts of this 
case." 138 Idaho 108, 111,58 P.3d 92, 95. The basis for that decision was that I.e. § 49-1301 
"directs the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident to immediately stop and to remain at the 
scene un~il he has fulfilled the requirements oflaw." Jd. The Idaho Supreme Court noted the 
purpose was "presumably to allow information concerning the accident." !d Wright argues the 
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following quote from the Idaho Supreme Court in Munns helps his argument: "In the case before us, 
where the property damage caused by the accident was to the front bumper of Swift's truck and to a 
runaway horse, the applicability of the statute is not obvious." Id. Nothing about that quote in dicta 
assists Wright. Munns is a negligence case. The quote from that negligence case Wright likes is 
dicta. Even in that setting, all the Idaho Supreme Court said was "the applicability of the statute is 
not obvious." The Idaho Supreme Court did not find the statute not applicable, unconstitutional or 
invalid. The actual reason (not the dicta) the Idaho Supreme Court found it error to give a 
negligence per se instruction based on I.C. § 49-1301 was: 
Moreover, a second, subsequent accident with the then dead horse was not the 
harm sought to be prevented by the statute. Thus, because the four-part test of 
Sanchez v. Galey has not been met, we conclude that I.e. § 49-1301(1) cannot be 
held to define conduct that would give rise to negligence per se under the facts of 
this case. We hold that Instruction 31 should not have been given to the jury. 
Id. Time and time again at oral argument, counsel for Wright made the following argument: "So 
what is the difference between a semi-truck and a horse, and a SUV and a street sign?" There are a 
lot of differences. First of all, this is a criminal matter in which Wright went off the road and struck 
a speed limit sign. The horse in Munns had to wander onto the roadway, where Wright had to 
wander off the roadway causing the accident breaking a governmental entity's street sign. Wright 
caused this accident. In doing so, Wright violated I.C. § 49-1301. 
Wright then argues the State failed to prove each essential element of the crime charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id, pp. 12-13. Wright states no evidence was introduced at trial that the 
speed limit sign was on public property or property open to the public, or that the accident here 
involved damage beyond that to the driver's (Wright's) vehicle. Id, p. 12. Wright contends I.C. §§ 
1301 and 1302 (Duty to Give Information in an Accident Involving Damage to a Vehicle) must be 
read in conjunction and, when so read, indicate they apply only to accidents involving something 
other than a single-vehicle collision with private property. Id, p. 13. This is a recurring theme for 
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Wright. He wants at times I.e. §§ 49-1302, 49-1303, 49-1304 and 48-1305 to all be grafted on to I.C 
§ 49-1301 when all Wright was ever charged with and was tried upon, was violating I.C. § 49-1301. 
The State responds it exercised its prosecutorial discretion in charging Wright under I.C. § 
49-1301, irrespective of the factors in § 49-1305 not being present. Memorandum Opposing 
Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 3-4. " ... [T]he criminal charge of leaving the scene of an accident is a 
[sic] different from the failure to locate and notify the owner of fixtures upon or adjacent to a 
highway." Id., p. 4. The State goes on to argue Munns' inapplicability to this case in light ofits 
focus on negligence, not on whether a defendant had committed the elements of the charge of 
leaving the scene of an accident. Id, p. 5. The State points to the trial record showing witnesses had 
personally observed Wright's vehicle slide off the public road and strike the speed limit sign adjacent 
to the public road, and to Judge Friedlander's finding of the location element beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Id The State disagrees with Wright's contention, that I.C. § 49-1301 is clarified by § 49-
1302, arguing that the two subsections contemplate different penalties. Id., pp. 5-6. Finally, the 
State points the Court to evidence in the record of damage to Wright's vehicle. Id, p. 6. 
In his response, Wright again argues § 49-1301 does not contemplate cases in which damage 
results only to the driver's vehicle. Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 3 . 
. . . [T]he statutory phrase 'resulting in only damage to a vehicle which is driven or 
attended by a person' does not include the vehicle driven by the driver who had the 
duty to provide information. There is no utility in remaining at the scene of an 
accident to provide information to yourself. 
Id. The plain language of § 49-1301 does not limit its application to the exchange of identification 
and insurance information. Indeed, that is not discussed at all in the statute. Wright goes on to 
reiterate his earlier argument that the Court should not reach the question of whether § 49-1301 
applies to the facts of this case in light of the State's failure to prove each essential element at trial. 
Id, p. 4. 
Again, Idaho Code § 49-1301 reads in part: 
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The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident, either on public or private property 
open to the public, resulting only in damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended 
by any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as 
close as possible, and shall immediately return to, and in every event shall remain at, 
the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of law. 
I.e. § 49-1301(1). Any failure to stop or to comply with the Code "shall" amount to a misdemeanor. 
I.C. § 49-1301(3). A conviction under subsection (1) of § 49-1301, "shall" result in a one-year 
revocation of driving privileges. I.C. § 49-1301(4). 
Statutory construction begins with consideration of the plain language of the statute. State v. 
Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685,688 (1990) (Where statutory language is plain and 
unambiguous, Courts give effect to the statute as written without engaging in statutory construction.) 
Statutes are to be given their plain, obvious, and rational meaning. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 
659,978 P.2d214, 219 (1999). Here, § 49-1301 plainly and unambiguously requires the driver of 
any vehicle involved in an accident on public property, or private property open to the public, and 
resulting in damage to a vehicle, driven or attended by any person, to immediately stop and remain at 
the scene. The term "accident" is further defined at I.C. § 49-102(3): "'Accident' means any event 
that results in an unintended injury or property damage attributable directly or indirectly to the 
motion of a motor vehicle ... " I.C. § 49-1 02(3) (emphasis added). Wright's argument is simply 
wrong. The language ofLC. § 49-1301 does not limit the resulting damage to be applicable only if 
damage results to only another vehicle as Wright argues. Had the legislature written I.C. § 49-1301 
such that it is violated where damage results to a vehicle "driven or attended by another person", 
Wright's position may have been tenable. However, LC. §49-1301 does not read that way. One of 
the underlying purposes of this breadth may well be to ensure drivers involved in any accident are 
not under the influence of intoxicating substances. States have traditional police powers to define 
criminal law and protect the health, safety and welfare of citizens. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 
66,125 S.Ct. 2195, 2234 (2005) (citing Brechtv. Abrahmson, 507 U.S. 619, 635,113 S.Ct. 1710 
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(1993); Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719, 105 S.Ct. 
2371 (1985»). The Code utilizes a broad approach, referring to any vehicle involved in any event 
causing injury or property damage. I.C §§ 49-1301(1), 49-102(3). 
As argued by the State, the evidence at trial demonstrated Wright was in a vehicle accident, 
and caused property damage to a fixture in addition to damage to his own vehicle. Munns, while 
being the one case to discuss I.e. § 49-1301 in any detail, involved the question of whether a jury 
had been properly instructed as to a driver's duty when involved in an accident between a single 
vehicle and an animal. 138 Idaho 108, 110,58 P.3d 92,94. The outcome in Munns, that § 49-
1301(3) does not define conduct which would be negligent per se, (in part because the statute was 
not intended to prevent the harm of an accident with an already-dead horse to a second driver 
(Munns), who strikes a horse left dead in the roadway by a first driver (Swift Transportation)), has no 
direct application to the facts now before the Court. 
But, although Wright's argument about the applicability ofLC. § 49-1301 must fail, the 
Court will briefly discuss LC. § 49-1304, the only one of the several additional statutes Wright wants 
to bring into this appeal which might apply. A question remains whether each essential element of 
the crime charged was proven. Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 1038 (used for violations of I.C. § 
49-1304) reads: 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Leaving the Scene of an Accident [Involving 
Fixtures], the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about [date], 
2. in the state ofIdaho, 
3. the defendant [name] was driving a motor vehicle 
4. which was involved in an accident resulting in damage to fixtures or other 
property legally upon or adjacent to a highway, 
5. the defendant had knowledge of the accident, and 
6. the defendant failed to do all of the following: 
a. take reasonable steps to locate the owner or person in charge of the property; 
b. notifY such person of the accident, the defendant's name and address, the 
name of the defendant's insurance agent or company if the defendant had 
automobile liability insurance, and the motor vehicle registration number of the 
vehicle the defendant was driving; and 
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c. exhibit [his] [her] driver's license, if it was available and the defendant was 
requested to exhibit it. 
If any ofthe above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty. 
ICJI 1038. In her factual findings, Judge Friedlander noted: on December 18,2009, two witnesses 
observed a Jeep Cherokee slide and strike a speed limit sign on an icy day (Tr., p. 53, Ll. 11-20); 
according to both witnesses, only the driver was in this Jeep Cherokee (Tr. p. 54, Ll. 1-6), law 
enforcement traced the vehicle to Wright based on the witness' license plate report and corroborating 
evidence at the scene (Tr., p. 54, Ll. 7-23); law enforcement contacted Wright's wife at their 
residence, she telephoned Wright, and Deputy Leyk spoke with Wright (Tr., p. 55, Ll. 11-23); Wright 
informed the deputy that he had been in an accident, having slipped on ice and knocked over a traffic 
sign, and that he was going to "self-report" the accident (Tr., pp. 55-56, L. 25, Ll. 1-2); and that 
when law enforcement went to Wright's business/place of employment, they observed damage to the 
vehicle which matched debris found at the scene, but Wright at that point denied being the driver 
(Tr., p. 56, Ll. 4-12). 
This Court is to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and not 
substitute its judgment for that of Judge Friedlander as to credibility and weight. See State v. Allen, 
129 Idaho 556, 558, 929 P.2d 118, 120. Judge Friedlander was presented with evidence that, on 
December 18,2009, in the State ofIdaho, Wright was the driver ofa vehicle which was involved in 
an accident, knocking down a speed limit sign on Nita Ave., Wright knew he struck the sign, and 
Wright failed to stop or make any of the notifications contemplated in' 6 ofICJI 1038. There exists 
substantial evidence supporting each essential element of the crime charged and the crime most 
applicable which was not charged. Even considering Wright's theory that LC. § 49-1301 does not 
define what the "requirements of the law" are, I.C. § 49-1304 would be the most applicable, and 
Wright fails tmder that statute as well. 
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C. WRIGHT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS NOT 
VIOLATED. 
Wright's final argument is that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated by the 
trial court's error in explaining a withheld judgment to Wright. Id., p. 14. 
Because the Defendant's request for counsel was overcome by erroneous and 
incomplete legal advise [sic] and information provided by the prosecutor and trial 
court, the Defendant's waiver of his right to counsel was not knowing, voluntary or 
intelligent and the judgment imposed in this case should be vacated and set aside and 
this matter remanded for sentencing. 
ld., p. 15. First of all, contrary to Wright's briefing and Wright's counsel's claims at oral argument, 
Wright never asked for an attorney for sentencing. As set forth above, the colloquy pertained to 
appeal. Tr., p. 57, Ll. 11-14. Even if Wright meant to ask for an attorney for purposes of 
sentencing, after such obtuse request by Wright, Judge Friedlander three times offered to continue 
sentencing to a later date. Even if this Court could go so far as to find that Wright invoked his right 
to counsel for sentencing (it can't), Wright subsequently changed his mind and chose to proceed to 
sentencing without an attorney. The State responds to Wright's argument by citing the three 
occasions on which Judge Friedlander offered to set disposition on a later date if Wright wished to 
seek the advice of counsel. Memorandum Opposing Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 6-7. The State 
goes on to argue that, even if Judge Friedlander's explanation of a withheld judgment was incorrect, 
such error would be harmless because Wright's substantial rights were not affected. Id., p. 7. The 
State notes a conviction under I.C. § 49-1301 requires a one-year license suspension pursuant to 
subsection (4) regardless of any disposition entered. Id, pp. 7-8. 
Wright replies his waiver of his right to counsel was not knowing, intelligent or voluntary 
because: 
Whether, the sentence imposed would have had differing effect if the sentencing 
hearing had been delayed and counsel obtained or not is of no moment to whether a 
substantial right of the Defendant had been affected by the way to post trial 
proceedings transpired. 
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Appellant's Reply brief, p. 6. No legal citation is given for this bald statement. 
As noted by both parties, the right to counsel attaches at sentencing. In Brown v. State, 108 
Idaho 655, 656, 701 P.2d 275, 276 (Ct.App. 1985), the Idaho Court of Appeals wrote: 
Our Supreme Court has held that Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution and the 
sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution entitle a defendant 
to representation by counsel at sentencing. State v. [Dennis} Brown, 98 Idaho 209, 
560 P.2d 880 (1977). Thus, "in the absence of a knowing, intelligent and voluntary 
waiver of the right to counsel, the district court may not proceed with the sentencing 
hearing when the defendant is not represented by counsel without some evidence or 
finding that the defendant has discharged his counsel in order to delay or hinder the 
judicial process. Id., at 212,560 P.2d at 883. 
A knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver, in turn, requires that a defendant be made aware 
of the risks inherent in self-representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 
2541 (1975). The burden rests with the State to show a waiver satisfied this standard and if a 
defendant was deprived of the right to counsel by a trial court's acceptance of an invalid waiver, the 
error is fundamental. State v. Hunnel, 125 Idaho 623, 625, 873 P.2d 877, 879 (1994). In State v. 
Jackson, 140 Idaho 636, 97 P.3d 1025 (Ct.App. 2004), the Idaho Court of Appeals reviewed and 
compared cases holding that a specific warning regarding the dangers of self-representation is a 
prerequisite for a constitutionally valid waiver, as opposed to those cases in which a defendant need 
only be aware of the disadvantages of proceeding pro se, but did not establish a bright-line rule. 140 
Idaho 636,640-41,97 P.3d 1025, 1029-30. The Court wrote: 
We conclude that even if judicial admonitions are not constitutionally required, 
Jackson's waiver here was invalid because the record does not otherwise disclose that 
he, at the time he chose to represent himself, appreciated the risks of proceeding pro 
se. Although Jackson does have a criminal record with charges dating back to 1980, 
and he has demonstrated some ability to file motions and perform legal research, 
nothing in the record indicates that he ever represented himself in previous criminal 
proceedings or that he had received Faretta warnings on a previous occasion. 
Nothing indicates that Jackson understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation when he voiced his decision to proceed pro se. The record here is 
insufficient to demonstrate a valid waiver of his right to counsel at trial. 
140 Idaho 636, 641, 97 P.3d 1025, 1030. 
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Here, Judge Friedlander began the Court Trial by ensuring Wright was "advised of your 
rights including your right to a lawyer and court-appointed counsel. Is that correct?" Tr., p. 1, Ll. 8-
10. Wright indicated he had been so advised. Tr., p. 1, L. 11. Wright then stated a pretrial motion 
for discovery had been served upon the State at the pretrial conference, but no reply had been 
received. Tr., p. 1, Ll. 18-22. Prior to disposition, Judge Friedlander welcomed Wright's request for 
additional time to "consult with an attorney for an appeal." Tr, p. 57, Ll. 13-17. Judge Friedlander 
also noted that, although she was inclined to withhold judgment, "if you would care to have this 
matter scheduled for sentencing, even though Mr. Reierson would like to go forward, I would give 
you the time to have it uh, set, and I think that's a fair request and frankly required at law." Tr., p. 
60, Ll. 12-16. In comparing the facts of the instant matter to those present in Jackson, here, Wright 
agreed he had received Faretta-type warnings, he unsuccessfully attempted to file a discovery 
motion, and he had no criminal history. Wright stated he wished to consult an attorney about an 
appeal, not disposition following conviction, and as the instant appeal demonstrates, he has had the 
opportunity to do so. Tr., p. 57, Ll. 11-14. Wright's representation on appeal, and his opting to 
move forward with disposition in light of Judge Friedlander's willingness to set sentencing out, over 
the State's objection, weigh in favor of the waiver's having been constitutionally valid. This Court 
cannot find that Judge Friedlander accepted an invalid waiver, but rather that Wright opted not to 
continue the date on which disposition would take place. 
Counsel for Wright argues "The trial court[']s advise also flies in the face of the United 
States v. Sharp, that a withheld judgment operates as a conviction in Idaho until the case is dismissed 
following the Defendant's successful completion of probation." Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 14-
15. First, that is not what Judge Friedlander told him. All Judge Friedlander said along those lines is 
"Then you could ---(inadible) ... have a conviction at that point, obviously." Tr. p. 60, Ll. 2-3. 
Second, the citation for the case is United States v. Sharp, 145 Idaho 403, 179 PJd 1059 (2008). 
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Third, Sharp says a convictions occurs by the verdict of a jury (in this case the verdict was by Judge 
Friedlander) or upon a plea of guilty, and it must precede punishment. 145 Idaho 403, 404, 179 P.3d 
1059, 1060. And nothing about that fact changes the next paragraph of this Court's decision. 
The most important reason there is no invalid waiver is the outcome could not have been any 
different with an attorney. Wright's main complaint seems to be with the fact that even with a 
withheld judgment his driver's license will be suspended (it has not been suspended yet due to the 
stay granted with Wright's appeal). But this license suspension occurs not due to any act of Judge 
Friedlander, but rather, by the Idaho Transportation Department due to automatic operation of the 
statute upon a fmding of guilt. Idaho Code § 49-1301(4) reads: "The department shall revoke for a 
period of one (1) year the driver's license, privileges or permit to drive, or the nonresident operating 
privilege, of any person convicted of a violation of subsection (1) of this section." As soon as 
Wright was found guilty by Judge Friedlander, a license suspension by the Idaho Transportation 
Department occurs. That suspension occurs whether Wright received a withheld judgment on his 
misdemeanor conviction or a regular sentence. This license suspension is mandatory, it occurs in 
every single case involving a violation of I. C. § 49-1301. The fact that this license suspension occurs 
at the hands of the Idaho Department of Transportation is totally out of the hands of Judge 
Friedlander. Thus, even if Wright's right to counsel were violated, such violation is harmless error 
because no substantial right of Wright was affected. Wright could have assembled his own "dream 
team" of lawyers to appear before Judge Friedlander for sentencing, and the Idaho Transportation 
Department would still suspend Wright's license. 
IV. CONCLUSION: 
For the reasons set forth above, Judge Friedlander's conviction and sentence must be 
affirmed. 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the Judgment imposed by Judge Friedlander on March 1, 2010, 
is AFFIRMED in all aspects. This case is REMANDED back to Magistrate Division for any further 
action. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the stay entered on June 1,2010, by this Court is 
RESCINDED, Wright's license is suspended immediately. 
DATED this 11th day of May, 2011 
I hereby certifY that on the II day of May, 2011 copies of the foregoing Order were mailed, postage prepaid, 
or sent by facsimile or interoffice mail to: 
Defense Attorney - Richard K. Kuck (0 01-~ 371 Honorable Judge Penny Friedlander 
Prosecuting Attorney - lJ-LI&-1 ~ 3? r . 0 . 
State ofldaho Transportation Department ~ 08~??cr-f73"J 
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